only to reject it. He accepts *Triebe* (the instinctive impulses) as indispensable foundations of all understanding of behaviour; but he repudiates almost all the rest of the Freudian doctrines.

Goldstein regards stability or constancy of the organism as its most distinctive peculiarity, in this agreeing with N. Bohr and myself. ' We need/ he writes, ' a criterion which shall enable us to choose from the multitude of observations, those which are suited to characterize the being of an organism. Such a criterion seems given in the suitability to maintain the relative constancy *(Konstanz)* of the organism.[5] He gives a most interesting hint at a theory of some higher unity than that of the individual organism (a unity perhaps of the species) of which he says: * The being of their superordinate totality manifests itself to us only in and through the individual organism/

And he has these wise words, much to be commended, to all aspiring mechanists: * It is clear that our knowledge of the biological realm to be attained along the lines we follow can never be final and complete, that we must be content with a continual coming near to the truth.' For a complete and final knowledge is always only possible in virtue of the assumption of certain metaphysical postulates; and he rejects all such postulates.

Goldstein, then, has no theory, no explanation of the unity and wholeness of the organism. It is for him simply a fact, to be accepted, as Alexander would say, with natural piety. Although he decisively rejects epiphenomenalism and psycho-physical parallelism,

he sets but
little store by the conscious activities;
regarding them
as of essentially the same nature as the
vastly more
numerous activities which constitute
the life of the
organism. This, I think, is the explanation
of the fact